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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
Nos. 08-3442, 08-3631
___________
ALEXANDER RAZO
  
v.
NORDIC EMPRESS SHIPPING LTD.; ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., 
A LIBERIAN CORPORATION, a/k/a ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., 
d/b/a ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISE LINE, d/b/a ROYAL CARIBBEAN
INTERNATIONAL; ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISE LINE; ROYAL
CARIBBEAN INTERNATIONAL, INC.; ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, INC.,
JOHN DOE "A"; JOHN DOE "B"; JOHN DOE "C"
     ALEXANDER RAZO; CIELO RAZO,
Appellants at No. 08-3442
Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 12(a)
_____________
ALEXANDER RAZO
v.
NORDIC EMPRESS SHIPPING LTD.; ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., 
A LIBERIAN CORPORATION, a/k/a ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., 
d/b/a ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISE LINE, d/b/a ROYAL CARIBBEAN
INTERNATIONAL; ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISE LINE; ROYAL CARIBBEAN
INTERNATIONAL, INC.; ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, INC., JOHN DOE "A";
JOHN DOE "B"; JOHN DOE "C"
CIELO RAZO
(Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 12(a))
       NORDIC EMPRESS SHIPPING LTD.,
2Appellant at No. 08-3631
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 2-07-cv-05745)
District Judge:  The Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 1, 2009
Before: McKEE, CHAGARES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 28, 2009)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Because our opinion is wholly without precedential value, and because the parties
and the District Court are familiar with its operative facts, we offer only an abbreviated
recitation to explain why we will affirm the order of  the District Court.
Razo, a citizen of the Philippines, was employed on board the cruise ship M/V
Empress of the Seas.  Royal Caribbean was the operator and bareboat charterer of the
M/V Nordic Empress.  Nordic Empress Shipping owned the ship.  Razo alleges that he
was injured during a lifeboat drill.  He brought various claims against numerous parties in
3New Jersey state court, including claims for Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness
against Royal Caribbean and Nordic.  The case was removed to the District Court.  
Razo was employed by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement that
incorporated a Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration ("POEA") standard
contract.  Relying on the terms of that contract, Royal Caribbean and Nordic successfully
sought to compel arbitration of his claims.  Razo now appeals the District Court’s order to
compel, arguing that the claims are not removable pursuant to the Savings to Suitors
clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 and the anti-removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a), applicable
to Jones Act and the Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases. 
Razo first complains that the District Court erred in ruling that an arbitration
agreement existed between himself and Royal Carribean at the time of Razo’s injury.  We
agree with the District Court that the following provision was properly incorporated into
Razo’s contract: “[i]n cases of claims and disputes arising from [seafaring] employment,
the parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement, shall submit the claim or dispute
to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators." 
Razo argues that this incorporated language conflicts with Section 5 of the
contract, which states: “all claims disputes or controversies that may arise from this
employment contract shall be brought by the herein parties exclusively before the proper
courts in Metro Manila." We agree with the District Court however, that the plain
4language of Section 5 dictates the venue of the arbitration.  Therefore, we do not find any
conflict between Section 2 and Section 5.  
Razo next argues that, even if the provisions of the contract do not conflict, the
agreement is unenforceable under the New York Convention Act.  9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 
An arbitration agreement falls under the Convention if: “(1) there is an agreement in
writing to arbitrate the dispute; (2) the agreement provides for arbitration in the territory
of a Convention signatory; (3) the agreement arises out of a commercial legal
relationship; and (4) a party to the agreement is not an American citizen.”  Francisco v. 
STOLT ACHIEVEMENT MT, 293 F.3d 270, 273 (5  Cir. 2002).  Moreover, theth
Convention Act mandates arbitration if these requirements are met.  Id. 
We have already ruled that there is an agreement to arbitrate.  It is beyond question
that the Philippines is a signatory to the Convention and that Razo is not a United States
citizen.  We also find that the District Court was correct in concluding that contracts of
employment for seaman are not excluded from the term “commercial” in the Convention
Act.  For these reasons we do not find any error in the District Court’s conclusion that the
Convention Act applies to the contract at issue, compelling arbitration here. 
Moreover, we find no reason to disturb the District Court’s ruling that the forum
for arbitration is the Philippines.  The District Court correctly ruled that Razo’s reliance
on the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 30104 et seq.), the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (45
U.S.C. § 51 et seq.) and  46 U.S.C. § 30509 is misplaced.  The Convention Act provides a
5separate basis for jurisdiction, and seaman employment contracts are encompassed by that
Act.  Therefore, the Jones Act does not apply and, because of this, the provisions of the
Federal Employer’s Liability Act are not implicated.  Moreover, Razo cannot rely on 46
U.S.C. §30509, which applies to passengers of common carriers.  Finally, it is axiomatic
that Razo, as a plaintiff, cannot invoke forum non conveniens to move the arbitration
from the Philippines.
With regard to Nordic’s appeal of the District Court’s remand of Razo’s
unseaworthiness claims against Nordic, we agree with the District Court’s analysis that,
as owner of the ship, Nordic cannot dodge potential liability through contractual
provisions.  Moreoever, the District Court was correct in determining that Nordic cannot
rely upon the arbitration agreement that binds Royal Caribbean and Razo as a defense
here.  The District Court properly remanded this claim.  
For all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.   
